Being and its Primary Determinations

As I attempt to understand metaphysics, I have decided to start reading Coffey’s introduction to ontology. As an exercise directed toward a contemplative end, I have decided to summarize what Coffey outlines throughout the first chapter of his work Ontology or the Theory of Being. A long list of blog-posts subsequent to this short summary will cover Coffey’s entire book in chronological order.

Accordingly, because of the metaphysically all-encompassing nature of “being” (e.g., a reality, an object, a person, existence, etc.), of which includes and inheres within each and every constituent object and distinct mode, Coffey explains that “without it [being] we could have no concept of anything.” (Being and its Primary Determinations, c. 1, p. 47) [emphasis mine] Being, as such, is logically prior throughout all rational processes of thought and chronologically prior to all things as when one first conceives of an object of thought the object of thought pertains primarily to being.

Hence, being is classified as foremost. For a child first conceives of an object of thought as it pertains to being, irrespective to the superficial nature of that particular thought (i.e., whether the thought is vague). Subsequent, once a child develops and enters adulthood, the adult accordingly moves on to conceive of determinate modes of being of a definite kind (i.e., less vague thoughts of a particular kind).

Nevertheless, Coffey states that the “direct notion of being is likewise the most indeterminate of all notions; though not of course entirely indeterminate.” (Being and its Primary Determinations, ch. 1, p. 47) Certainly, Coffey here is arguing that even the most indeterminate notions of being remain definite in some particular degree. For if we are even to consider indeterminate notions of being as intelligible we must first positively predicate being to such notions as in contrast with absolute nothingness (i.e., non-being).

Simply, Coffey is seemingly reacting against the Hegelian philosophy of "pure thought", arguing that absolute indeterminateness must be conceived of as definite, contrary to the Hegelian thesis, in some sense inasmuch one wishes to conceive of being, at least in its broadest sense, inherently intelligible.  

The above summary pertains to section (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Coffey’s introduction, as read from his first chapter Being and its Primary Determinations, taken from Ontology or the Theory of Being. 

I hope you profit from my reading and explanation.