Coffey's General Introduction: The Sciences

In the introduction to Coffey’s Ontology or the Theory of Being, the author sets out an Aristotelian distinction between the natural sciences and special science (i.e., metaphysics). The purpose underlying the distinction between the natural sciences, on the one hand, and special science (the more general science), of which metaphysics is referred to contemporarily, on the other, pertains to the close realization of the “nature and scope of the latter.” (General Introduction, p. 7)

Specifically, natural sciences (i.e., physiology, biology, physics, etc.) are concerned with partial explanations, relative to the subject-matter of that particular field. As such, the special sciences are concerned with proximate causal explanations of data that are rendered accessible in somewhat of a chronological sequence. As an example, Coffey explains: “physiology studies the functions of living organisms; geology studies the formation of the earth's crust.” (General Introduction, p. 7) Contrarily, metaphysics, the special science, is concerned with remote and ultimate causal explanations of particular objects as well as all reality. Simply, qualitative questions are accessible to metaphysical inquiry, lying outside of the domain of the natural sciences, such as the “ever recurring questions of the whence? And whither? and why? of man and the universe.” (General Introduction, p. 39) Consequentially, metaphysics concerns itself with the inquiry of being, essence, and attributes—inhering within all reality, these categories constitute all objects which maintain existence as opposed to non-being (i.e., nothingness). 

Nevertheless, Coffey’s distinction is helpful insofar one desires to determine the primary relevance of either field in contrast and by their particular respect. Further, Coffey’s distinction allows for each distinctive field to retain its particular worth as complimentary rather than detractive. Metaphysics, by its respective endeavour, essentially aids the natural sciences in granting the natural sciences, relative to their subject matter, categorical causal depth.

Being and its Primary Determinations (2)

In section (e) of Coffey’s Being and its Primary Determinations, Coffey explains that “being” is the “most abstract of all notions, poorest in intension as it is widest in extension.” (Being and its Primary Determinations, ch. 1, p. 48) Certainly “being” is not just an abstract concept that does not maintain concrete existence. For as Coffey explains throughout sections (a), (b), (c) and (d), "being" certainly maintains concrete existence in some degree. Nonetheless, I take Coffey to mean that “being”, understood as abstract, is considered in one’s mind independent from other objects of thought. It is in this sense, where "being" is understood as the most abstract of all notions, that Coffey implies that being is the greatest concept of consideration. 

Still, as Coffey later explains, “being” lacks exhaustive depth insofar as one attempts to distinctively define “being”. Likewise, “being” remains kept as continual, inhering within all things in the broadest sense, as it is positively predicated of all things.

Nevertheless, the concept of “being” is derived from our, either collective or particular, experience, while this process of derivation is arrived at by method of abstraction. Thusly, in reference to abstraction, Coffey explains that the differences which distinguish one object from another are not strictly considered as differences. Rather, such differences aren't taken into consideration but are abstracted from mentally. For what is of utmost importance is not the difference between two objects as they exist in relation to one another but rather what is universal to all being, irrespective of its particular mode.

From this, Coffey concludes: “This common element forms the explicit content of our notion of being.” (Being and its Primary Determinations, ch. 1, p. 48)

Being and its Primary Determinations

As I attempt to understand metaphysics, I have decided to start reading Coffey’s introduction to ontology. As an exercise directed toward a contemplative end, I have decided to summarize what Coffey outlines throughout the first chapter of his work Ontology or the Theory of Being. A long list of blog-posts subsequent to this short summary will cover Coffey’s entire book in chronological order.

Accordingly, because of the metaphysically all-encompassing nature of “being” (e.g., a reality, an object, a person, existence, etc.), of which includes and inheres within each and every constituent object and distinct mode, Coffey explains that “without it [being] we could have no concept of anything.” (Being and its Primary Determinations, c. 1, p. 47) [emphasis mine] Being, as such, is logically prior throughout all rational processes of thought and chronologically prior to all things as when one first conceives of an object of thought the object of thought pertains primarily to being.

Hence, being is classified as foremost. For a child first conceives of an object of thought as it pertains to being, irrespective to the superficial nature of that particular thought (i.e., whether the thought is vague). Subsequent, once a child develops and enters adulthood, the adult accordingly moves on to conceive of determinate modes of being of a definite kind (i.e., less vague thoughts of a particular kind).

Nevertheless, Coffey states that the “direct notion of being is likewise the most indeterminate of all notions; though not of course entirely indeterminate.” (Being and its Primary Determinations, ch. 1, p. 47) Certainly, Coffey here is arguing that even the most indeterminate notions of being remain definite in some particular degree. For if we are even to consider indeterminate notions of being as intelligible we must first positively predicate being to such notions as in contrast with absolute nothingness (i.e., non-being).

Simply, Coffey is seemingly reacting against the Hegelian philosophy of "pure thought", arguing that absolute indeterminateness must be conceived of as definite, contrary to the Hegelian thesis, in some sense inasmuch one wishes to conceive of being, at least in its broadest sense, inherently intelligible.  

The above summary pertains to section (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Coffey’s introduction, as read from his first chapter Being and its Primary Determinations, taken from Ontology or the Theory of Being. 

I hope you profit from my reading and explanation.