Coffey's General Introduction: The Sciences

In the introduction to Coffey’s Ontology or the Theory of Being, the author sets out an Aristotelian distinction between the natural sciences and special science (i.e., metaphysics). The purpose underlying the distinction between the natural sciences, on the one hand, and special science (the more general science), of which metaphysics is referred to contemporarily, on the other, pertains to the close realization of the “nature and scope of the latter.” (General Introduction, p. 7)

Specifically, natural sciences (i.e., physiology, biology, physics, etc.) are concerned with partial explanations, relative to the subject-matter of that particular field. As such, the special sciences are concerned with proximate causal explanations of data that are rendered accessible in somewhat of a chronological sequence. As an example, Coffey explains: “physiology studies the functions of living organisms; geology studies the formation of the earth's crust.” (General Introduction, p. 7) Contrarily, metaphysics, the special science, is concerned with remote and ultimate causal explanations of particular objects as well as all reality. Simply, qualitative questions are accessible to metaphysical inquiry, lying outside of the domain of the natural sciences, such as the “ever recurring questions of the whence? And whither? and why? of man and the universe.” (General Introduction, p. 39) Consequentially, metaphysics concerns itself with the inquiry of being, essence, and attributes—inhering within all reality, these categories constitute all objects which maintain existence as opposed to non-being (i.e., nothingness). 

Nevertheless, Coffey’s distinction is helpful insofar one desires to determine the primary relevance of either field in contrast and by their particular respect. Further, Coffey’s distinction allows for each distinctive field to retain its particular worth as complimentary rather than detractive. Metaphysics, by its respective endeavour, essentially aids the natural sciences in granting the natural sciences, relative to their subject matter, categorical causal depth.